China's Dilemma: Can a "Fragile Superpower" Rise Peacefully?
Ji Liu and Feng Liu's review of Susan Shirk's The Fragile Superpower
In this book review by Ji Liu and Feng Liu from Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University, Susan Shirk's "The Fragile Superpower" is critically assessed regarding its exploration of how China's internal political fragility affects its foreign policy. Shirk argues that the Chinese leadership prioritizes political survival. Thus, tends to adopt a narrow nationalist and aggressive stance in foreign policy to mobilize society and divert attention from domestic political issues, making China impossible to rise peacefully. While the author appreciates Shirk's insights, they critique her American-centric biases and oversimplifications, emphasizing the importance of considering deeper structural economic factors and international dynamics. Ultimately, they highlight that the interplay between domestic pressures and international relationships is crucial in understanding whether China can rise peacefully.
Ji Liu and Feng Liu’s book review of "The Fragile Superpower," titled: “中国崛起的内部因素——评谢淑丽《脆弱的超级大国》” was originally published in 文化纵横 on WeChat.
Internal Factors of China's Rise: A Review of Susan Shirk's 'The Fragile Superpower
If you were a nation’s leader, what structural constraints would you face in diplomatic decision-making? Why would you choose aggressive foreign policies in areas where you should be moderate and steady? The book "The Fragile Superpower" analyzes China's foreign policy options entirely from the perspective of top political leadership. Although the author Susan Shirk's views are overly biased and her value judgments are somewhat too "American," the book is not a mediocre work that fails to address these core issues. Why can't China rise peacefully? By analyzing the political survival anxieties of the top leadership, Shirk indeed provides us with a unique perspective that offers considerable insight.
In the fall of 2005, when President Hu Jintao met with President George W. Bush, he repeatedly emphasized that China's internal problems were numerous and complex and that China would not pursue hegemony to become a threat to the United States. However, in Shirk's view, China's internal fragility is precisely the real danger to the United States. Unlike many ordinary Americans, She is not worried about China becoming a great power through economic development; rather, she is concerned about the fragility within China. She tries to remind Americans that while the U.S. cannot effectively influence the stability of China's domestic politics, it must recognize that internal instability in China can easily lead its top leadership to take aggressive stances on international issues.
Has China truly adopted an aggressive stance? This question itself is subject to debate. Some scholars argue that China’s diplomatic policies in real-world issues contradict Susan Shirk’s interpretation. In situations where nationalism surged, such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy or the Hainan Island incident, one would expect the leadership to adopt an aggressive policy. However, in reality, this was not the case. China’s position on issues like the Taiwan Strait, Diaoyu Islands, South China Sea, and East China Sea has historically not been aggressive. Even in its policy declarations, China tends to present itself in an idealistic manner, frequently employing “harmonious” humanistic concepts to express its diplomatic stance.
If this is indeed the case, Shirk's subsequent explanations lose their significance. Nevertheless, regardless of the empirical starting point of Shirk's arguments, it is worthwhile to first understand the author. Unlike other media commentators, Susan Shirk is a qualified expert with the credibility to offer her views on this subject. If there are true “China experts” in U.S. political and diplomatic circles, aside from Kenneth Lieberthal, Shirk would certainly be considered one of them. She has met with successive Chinese top leaders, arriving in China even earlier than Nixon’s envoy, Henry Kissinger. On July 19, 1971, as a graduate student, Shirk was received by Premier Zhou Enlai in the Great Hall of the People. Over twenty years later, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China during Clinton’s second term, during which the notorious bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia occurred.
However, Shirk’s extensive experience does not guarantee that her analysis hits the mark. Despite her efforts to adopt the Chinese leadership's perspective in considering China’s foreign policy, she ultimately remains an American scholar playing the role of a leader, and her "performance" appears somewhat awkward. The most obvious issue is that all her analyses and interpretations are permeated by an American value-laden perspective. These interpretations may completely misunderstand the intentions of the parties involved, leading to misrepresentations. For instance, Shirk's characterization of Chinese political leaders’ personal goals (such as labeling top leaders as “Communist autocrats”) and her understanding of popular nationalism in China (which she sees as “closed,” “paranoid,” and “narrow-minded”) are likely to spark controversy and alienate many Chinese people. However, these involve value judgments, making logical refutations difficult. Any rebuttal would likely express a unilateral emotional response from the Chinese side, lacking theoretical significance. Therefore, the following discussion will set aside Shirk's value judgments, focusing instead on her logic to assess the strengths and weaknesses of her argument. In other words, we will engage with her logic and play a game of "point-counterpoint."
Shirk’s central argument is quite straightforward: China’s domestic political fragility prevents its peaceful rise. In her view, China’s political system is highly centralized, and the legitimacy of its leadership is not adequately secured. Therefore, the top political leaders’ primary concern is ensuring political survival, rather than pursuing economic development or seeking international hegemony. With economic growth and social development, the state's control over society has steadily weakened. The rise of the internet and other new media has further increased the pressure on politicians from the public. Additionally, domestic political issues arising from economic transformation—such as large-scale unemployment, corruption, unrest in ethnic regions, mass incidents in rural areas, and nationalist sentiments—have put further strain on the leadership. The leadership's strategy is to prioritize “political stability above all else.” Shirk summarizes three specific strategies employed by the leadership: avoiding splits among the leadership, preventing large-scale social unrest, and ensuring that the military and the Party remain unified. However, as traditional socialist ideology has increasingly come under attack, the leadership has abandoned its moderate and steady strategy, instead resorting to narrow nationalism as a means of mobilizing social cohesion in foreign policy.
Throughout this book, Shirk’s logical framework is clear: the instability of China's domestic political structure leads the leadership to prioritize political survival as their core objective. To achieve this goal, under the constraints of the existing international structure, the leadership tends to adopt a narrow nationalist and aggressive stance in foreign policy to mobilize society and divert attention from domestic political issues. Thus, China cannot rise peacefully.
Based on this logical chain, Shirk’s argument rests on two key points, which will be analyzed in turn to discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
First, a country’s foreign policy is determined by its domestic factors. In other words, foreign policy is not only the result of state-to-state interactions on the international level but is also influenced by the relationship between the state and society at the domestic level. Shirk’s perspective differs from traditional international relations theories, particularly realist theories. Classical realist theory treats the state as an independent unit of analysis, focusing solely on the interactions between states and disregarding internal dynamics. Hence, classical theory emphasizes the security dilemma faced by states in an anarchic international environment. Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is a classic example of this type of analysis. In an anarchic system, city-states must ensure their survival, and any rising power inevitably threatens the stability of the established international order. Thus, Athens’ rise inevitably threatened Sparta’s survival, making war between them inevitable.
However, states are not homogeneous entities. Their domestic political and economic forces, as well as institutional structures, inevitably influence their external behavior. In exploring the domestic factors in international relations, Peter Katzenstein was a pioneer, noting that "international political economy remains unintelligible without a systematic analysis of domestic structures." Following Katzenstein, even the staunchest realist scholars began to recognize the importance of analyzing domestic factors. Under this intellectual trend, international relations theories that incorporate domestic factors have developed rapidly, often providing more persuasive explanations than purely international theories. What Shirk has done is merely to follow this scholarly trend, opening the “black box” of the state when explaining China’s foreign policy.
However, it is important to note that the structural constraints of classical realist theory still hold. From the perspective of real power dynamics, China does not yet pose a threat to U.S. hegemony. Nonetheless, from the perspective of maintaining its hegemonic position, it is reasonable for the U.S. to contain China. As one scholar has said, in a unipolar structure, the hegemon is highly sensitive to and has little tolerance for rising powers, and has the strongest ability to contain them. The U.S.’s concern over China's domestic political fragility stems from the fact that China is growing into a major power. If China were a weaker nation like Myanmar or Vietnam, even if it were in political turmoil, it would be a regional issue and not a significant concern for the U.S.
Second, among all domestic factors, the choices made by the top decision-makers, who hold concentrated power, for the sake of political survival are the most critical. Susan Shirk places such emphasis on the leadership’s political survival anxiety based on the characteristics of China's political system. Indeed, under the current system, policy-making authority lies with the highest decision-makers in the state. Their primary concern is political survival, and the choices they make within the constraints of the existing system largely determine the direction of policies.
The concentration of power in China’s political system is reflected both in the centralization of authority between the central and local governments and in the high degree of centralization at the party central itself. At the party central, power is concentrated in the hands of the top leadership, who are able to avoid political splits, rather than dispersed among various institutions or individuals with checks and balances. In such a centralized government, decision-making authority is more concentrated in the political elite. Hence, Shirk’s focus on the top leadership as the key actors in the policy-making process is a highly effective perspective. In contrast, in a democratic country with dispersed power, such as the United States, one must consider not only the president but also Congress and the activities of domestic pressure groups, making the situation far more complex.
However, the concentration of power is a double-edged sword. States with concentrated power enjoy what Michael Mann calls despotic power, but often lose infrastructural power, the ability to effectively mobilize society, which makes them more concerned about social stability. As a result, despite the appearance of centralized power and a united front on foreign policy, the leadership must still absorb more bottom-up policy pressures, such as from bureaucratic departments and emerging interest groups. Considering this, the extent of the difference between centralized and decentralized governments in how domestic factors influence foreign policy remains unclear. Shirk also fails to provide sufficient justification for the so-called “democratic peace theory”—the idea that Western democratic countries do not adopt aggressive foreign policies, while non-democratic countries are more prone to aggression. This oversimplified logic has been widely criticized in academic circles, which have largely dismissed it, leading to a more nuanced categorization of democracies and authoritarian regimes. However, the basic causal relationship underpinning the democratic peace theory becomes more uncertain with further subdivision.
If this point is not fully established, then Shirk’s logical framework is problematic. We must question whether the key to China's peaceful rise lies in the dilemma caused by political centralization and the institutional constraints faced by top leaders for political survival. The political elite, seemingly caught in a survival dilemma, may simply be an exaggerated "pawn" in Shirk’s narrative. The real issue may lie in China’s structural changes, its economic problems, and the extent to which the domestic economic issues are tied to international politics. For example, as a late-developing nation, China’s rapid economic rise inherently poses a significant challenge to the region's political and economic relations. In other words, if national interests demand that China adopt an aggressive foreign policy, the leadership might act accordingly, even in a decentralized system.
Therefore, in judging whether China can rise peacefully, while we recognize the importance of domestic factors emphasized by Shirk, we should not be misled by her focus on the political survival dilemma of the leadership. Instead, we need to seek out the structural factors that truly matter. Ultimately, we must ask: What are China’s economic interests? What are the demands of these economic forces on the international level? Do these demands necessarily preclude a peaceful rise for China? In the areas of finance, trade, and energy, what kind of international status do China’s burgeoning domestic economic forces seek for the country as a whole? In other words, the structural changes within China's domestic economic forces are the key to whether China can rise peacefully.
That said, nationalism itself is an unreliable concept for analysis. Who exactly supports nationalism? Are the grassroots more fervent while the middle class is more moderate? Does the business sector exhibit divisions in its attitude toward nationalism? Do joint ventures oppose it while private capital supports it? How much does nationalism really quell opposition from the lower classes? Can nationalism truly solve the myriad problems arising from economic transition? Is the political leadership genuinely relying on nationalism as a consistent ideological tool for internal mobilization?
In fact, the political demands of narrow nationalism may be merely a surface phenomenon, with underlying economic interests being the true issue. A look at modern Chinese history reveals that nationalism has always existed, never disappearing. Since the Anti-Japanese War, the ruling party has gained popular support in its competition with the Kuomintang through nationalism and other ideological influences. Even in the prolonged period after the founding of the People's Republic, when class struggle was the dominant theme, nationalism remained a constant in mobilizing the populace against both the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand, China’s model of political centralization has not changed significantly. What has changed the most is China’s economy. If anything about China worries the world today, it ultimately comes down to the changes in its economy. We must explain change with change, not by using static factors to explain dynamic phenomena. Thus, nationalism is not the source of the problem but rather an ambiguous intermediary phenomenon that requires further explanation through other changes.
Shirk emphasizes the pressure placed on the political elite by grassroots nationalism, but there is also anti-nationalist pressure from society, such as from business groups advocating for a moderate and stable foreign policy. This is a fatal flaw in her argument: the pressure faced by the political elite comes not only from the demands of nationalist but also from the demands of economic groups. Who, among the internet users, grassroots, general public, or new business elites, is actually supporting nationalism? Who is more capable of influencing the government? Clearly, it is not as simple as Shirk suggests. The applicability of authoritarianism, like a one-size-fits-all label, is also in question. As the Chinese ruling party itself has acknowledged, agenda-setting is becoming increasingly “scientific” and “democratic.” In sum, Shirk lacks a deep and thorough analysis of the groups mobilized by nationalism and has not adequately explored the mechanisms for expressing interests and power centralization within China's political system. She merely lists a series of diplomatic events and explains the mobilization of narrow nationalism through the political choices of the leadership, aimed at diverting public attention, without carefully examining the precise connections between various domestic interest groups and nationalism.
At the end of the day, Shirk overemphasizes the influence of Chinese leaders on China’s foreign policy. Her explanation goes too far. For a country with concentrated power, the apparent monopoly of power by the top leadership makes Shirk’s perspective particularly compelling, as it seems that "a few individuals can decide everything." Consequently, policies are seen as driven by the leadership’s need to establish their own legitimacy. However, although politicians appear to hold concentrated and seemingly unrestricted power, their decisions are often constrained by societal pressures, which may be as intense as those faced by leaders in other countries. Shirk completely overlooks the structural economic demands within China—the country’s economic development inherently necessitates competition with the United States for international space. Whether China can rise peacefully ultimately depends on the demands of its economic interests. What are the interests of China’s new economic classes? How are they institutionally connected to the government? What are the economic demands of workers, farmers, and other grassroots groups? How do these demands intersect with international issues?
Moreover, beyond the domestic factors discussed above, the international factors emphasized by realist international relations theory are equally important. China’s peaceful rise is not determined solely by the interaction of domestic political and economic forces but also by its interaction with the hegemonic power and the international political-economic order it dominates. China might actively choose to abandon its peaceful rise or be forced to do so. Therefore, China’s peaceful rise depends on the attitude of the United States and the interactions between the two countries. According to the analysis of IR scholar Zhang Ruizhuang, the extent to which China poses a threat to the United States, and the nature of their bilateral relationship, largely depend on the attitude of the rising power toward the existing hegemon and its world order. This, in turn, depends on how the hegemon, the United States, maintains the legitimacy of its hegemony and manages its relationship with the rising power.
In simpler terms, Shirk only opens the black box of the Chinese state and hastily presents some fragments as evidence. But are there no domestic factors at play in the United States? The U.S. is similarly grappling with "domestic and foreign troubles," and its decision-makers are not without challenges. To paint a full picture, we must also consider the political and economic factors within the United States and the international strategy it adopts as a hegemon. In the end, it is the interaction of domestic and international factors, and political and economic forces at different levels and in different spheres, that will determine the final policy outcomes.
Reflecting on the photo of Shirk shaking hands with Premier Zhou Enlai and considering her tenure in the Clinton administration, we can imagine walking in her shoes and experiencing her journey. With her many years of experience as a political elite, it becomes easier to understand why she places such importance on the perspective of political survival anxiety in her analysis.
As I conclude this inaugural article for Tea Leaf Reading, I feel a mixture of excitement and gratitude. This journey of exploring and sharing insights into China’s complex policies has truly begun, and I am thrilled to have you along for the ride. Your support means the world to me, and I look forward to engaging with you as we delve deeper into the nuances of China together. Here’s to many more discussions and discoveries ahead!